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Abstract
Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation
for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing
that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-
based expectation equilibrium.




In Eyster and Rabin￿ s (2005) cursed equilibrium; while having correct conjec-
tures about the marginal distribution of each opponent￿ s type and that of each
opponent￿ s action, each player fails to correctly conjecture the extent of correla-
tion between these two. At an extreme, players conjecture no correlation. This
corresponds to the fully cursed equilibrium. At another extreme, conjectures are
correct. This is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In between, there is a continuum
of partially cursed equilibria each of which gives some weight ￿ to the cursed
conjectures. Eyster and Rabin show that "any value of ￿ 2 (0;0:6) provides
a better ￿t than does Bayesian Nash equilibrium" in all the experiments that
they analyze.
Several authors have questioned the existence of a reasonable foundation for
the partially cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005, p. 1633; Fudenberg,
2006, p. 702; Crawford and Irriberri, 2006, footnote 6). The requirement that
rational players have correct conjectures about the distribution of opponents￿
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1actions is demanding even in a normative model. The correct conjecture hypoth-
esis is even more troublesome in a descriptive model which tries to understand
and predict actual choice patterns: why should players correctly conjecture the
distribution of opponents￿actions and the distribution of their private informa-
tion but fail to conjecture the correlation between the two?
An avenue for justifying the correct conjecture hypothesis in the cursed
equilibrium is to consider players who have learned from repeated interaction.
Such a learning interpretation is in the core of the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008). This paper establishes
a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium by showing that it
corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium (ABEE).
Rather than assuming that players understand the strategy of the opponent
state by state, the ABEE supposes that players understand only the average
behavior of each of their opponents over bundles of states, called the analogy
classes. After each round of play, each player observes the others￿actions and
the analogy class where the underlying state belongs to, but not the exact
type. The player adopts the simplest conjecture consistent with her observations
and expects that the opponents condition their strategies coarsely on analogy
classes rather than on types. The conjectured strategy in the class thus correctly
represents the average behavior in the class.
In the proposition below, we establish even the partially cursed equilibrium
as a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium: the initial type space
can be extended to a state space where an equivalent analogy-based expectation
equilibrium exists. We map each ￿-partially cursed equilibrium in the original
type space, where the ￿￿space is [0;1], to the set of analogy-based expectation
equilibria of an extended state space. Since the ￿￿space of partially cursed
equilibria is uncountable, it seems natural that an equally rich state space is
required to allow for su¢ ciently ￿ne variations in the analogy partitions. It turns
out that the Borel sets on [0,1]-interval of real numbers with a Lebesgue measure
provide a rich enough and yet simple probability space. We can associate each
type pro￿le ￿ in the original space with an interval of elementary states of
length of the probability of that type pro￿le. Now, to map the ￿￿partially
cursed equilibria to the ABEE, we only need to choose a particular ￿ner-than-
private-information analogy partition for each player, where the analogy class
is a subset of the inverse image of the type pro￿le with probability 1￿￿ and it
bundles together all the opponent type pro￿les given own type with probability
￿.
2 Equilibrium concepts
2.1 The game and the cursed equilibrium
There are N players indexed by i = 1;:::;N: An action of player i is ai and the
￿nite set of actions1 available to her is Ai. The actions of players other than
1Independent of the type pro￿le.
2i are denoted by a￿i 2 ￿j6=iAj. An action pro￿le is a 2 A = ￿N
i=1Ai. Prior
to the play of a stage game, nature draws a type pro￿le, ￿ = (￿0;￿1;:::;￿N) 2
￿0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿N, each type pro￿le with probability p 2 ￿(￿). Without loss
of generality, we assume that each type pro￿le has a positive probability. The
vector of types of players other than i is ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i = ￿j6=i￿j: The outcomes
are type and action pro￿le combinations, (a;￿). The payo⁄ depends on the
actions and on the type pro￿le: ui : A￿￿ ! R for i = 1;:::;N. These elements
construe a simple Bayesian game, (￿0;(Ai;￿i;ui)N
i=1;p).
We can naturally extend the state space since the payo⁄-irrelevant uncer-
tainty is rich in any environment that a model may try to capture. We will
see that, this irrelevant uncertainty can be used to organize observations of op-
ponents￿behavior during a learning process thereby leading to partially cursed
equilibrium beliefs.
The extended stage game is a static game of incomplete information (￿;B;q;(Ai;
ui; ￿i)N
i=1;e ￿). The underlying exogenous uncertainty is modelled by means of
the probability space (￿;B;q) where ! 2 ￿ = [0;1] ￿ R is an elementary
state; B is the set of Borel sets on [0,1] and q is the Lebesgue measure. Let
the type pro￿le be a random variable e ￿ on (￿;B;q), that is e ￿ : ￿ ! ￿ and let
p(￿) = q(e ￿
￿1
(￿)) where e ￿
￿1
(￿) is the inverse image of ￿. The type of i that a
state ! is mapped into is denoted by e ￿i(!): For each b ￿i 2 ￿i, we can derive
the corresponding information set by I(￿i) = e ￿
￿1
i (￿i). The collection of such
information sets forms the information partition of i, Pi.
A strategy of player i is a function of her type, ￿i : ￿i ! ￿(Ai) and the
probability that type ￿i chooses action ai 2 Ai is denoted by ￿i(aij￿i): The
strategies of players other than i are denoted by ￿￿i : ￿￿i ! ￿j6=i￿(Aj) and a
strategy pro￿le is ￿ : ￿ ! ￿N
j=1￿(Aj). The conjecture of i about the strategy
of the opponents2 is denoted by b ￿￿i : ￿ ! ￿j6=i￿(Aj).
Let us next de￿ne the ￿￿cursed equilibrium introduced in Eyster and Rabin
(2005). To formalize the failure to understand correlations between opponents￿








The average strategy may pool together several type pro￿les and it maps the
type-speci￿c strategies into one pooling strategy independent of whichever type
is actually drawn from the set of others￿types in the image of B, e ￿￿i(B).
De￿nition 1 A strategy pro￿le ￿ is a ￿￿cursed equilibrium if for each i, ￿i 2
2The player may be unaware of the opponent￿ s private information partition. Therefore,











[￿￿￿i(a￿ijI(￿i)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿i(a￿ij￿￿i)]ui(a;￿) (2)
where ￿￿i(a￿ijI(￿i)) is given by (1). In particular, if ￿ = 1, then the equilibrium
is fully cursed.
It is straightforward to see that a cursed equilibrium is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium if ￿ = 0. Notice yet, that when ￿ > 0, players put a positive
weight on an average strategy in their conjectures. In this average strategy,
each player averages over the opponent types in the player￿ s own information
set. Therefore, when the equilibrium is fully cursed, ￿ = 1, each player type
ignores the correlation between each opponent￿ s private information and actions
given their own private information.
2.2 Learning and the analogy-based expectation equilib-
rium
The analogy-based expectation equilibrium can be regarded as a steady state
of anonymous learning3 and thus it is a special case of a conjectural (Bat-
tigalli, 1987) or a self-con￿rming equilibrium4 (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993;
Kreps and Fudenberg, 1995; Dekel et al., 2004). Learning is based upon sig-
nals observed after each round of play. In the ABEE, each player observes the
other players￿actions, a￿i, and an analogy class ￿i(!). The precision of player
i￿ s observation of others￿types is captured by the collection of such classes, the
analogy partition, which partitions the elementary states Ai. An analogy sys-
tem (A1;:::;AN) describes the partitions of each player i = 1;:::;N: Whereas a
player￿ s information partition describes how precisely the player observes infor-
mation at the interim stage, the analogy partition describes how precisely the
player observes the information ex-post when the game is played.
Implicitly, each player retains observations from a large number5 of preced-
ing rounds. She conjectures that, at a given elementary state, each opponent
plays his average strategy of the analogy class where that elementary state be-
longs to, ￿￿i(￿i(!)). This is the simplest theory consistent with observing the
analogy class rather than the precise opponent type6. Moreover, this is the only
3See Battigalli et al. (1992).
4Even partially cursed equilibria and corresponding ABEE are self-con￿rming, yet only if
opponent￿ s actions are not observed.
5The sample size is implicitly assumed to be in￿nite.
6Notice that in the ABEE players are not in general assumed to observe the own action-
type ex post. This is without loss of generality, since in this paper analogy-partitions will
be ￿ner than information partitions. The ABEE implicitly assumes that own payo⁄s are not
used to make inferences about others￿strategies. Cursed players may naturally fail to perceive
correlations between payo⁄s and own and others￿information and actions. Esponda (2007)
and Miettinen (2007) consider the e⁄ect of payo⁄ information on cursed steady state beliefs.
4consistent theory where each opponent plays a pooling strategy in each analogy
class. In a steady state, the best replies to the average strategy conjectures
generate outcomes and perceptions which do not contradict the conjectures.
The analogy-based expectation equilibrium can now be de￿ned as follows
De￿nition 2 The triple (￿i;b ￿￿i;￿i)N
i=1 is an Analogy-based expectation equi-
librium if










b ￿￿i(a￿ij!)ui(a;e ￿(!)) (3)
2. for all ! 2 ￿ and for all i, b ￿￿i(a￿ij!) = ￿￿i(a￿ij￿i(!))
We consider only analogy-based expectation equilibria7 where each player￿ s
analogy partition coincides or is ￿ner than the player￿ s information partition,
denoted by ABEEAi=Pi and ABEEAi￿Pi respectively.
3 Cursed equilibrium as an ABEE
As easily seen from the de￿nitions (and as acknowledged by Eyster and Rabin
(2005) and Jehiel and Koessler (2008)), when the analogy partitions coincide with
the private information partitions, the fully cursed equilibrium and the analogy-
based expectation equilibrium coincide. In the proposition below, we establish
even the partially cursed equilibrium as a particular analogy-based expectation
equilibrium: the initial type space can be extended to a state space where an
equivalent analogy-based expectation equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3 For each ￿￿cursed equilibrium of the game (￿0;(Ai;￿i;ui)N
i=1;p)
there exists an ABEE of the game (￿;B;q;(Ai; ui; ￿i)N
i=1;e ￿) such that the con-
jectures and the strategies coincide for the ￿￿cursed equilibrium and the ABEE.
The proof is relegated to the appendix but the idea is simple. To illustrate
(see ￿gure 1), suppose, that there are two players of which one and only one
is privately informed. She has two types, ￿1 and ￿2. Suppose that the under-
lying payo⁄-irrelevant uncertainty is richer so that the elementary states are
the real numbers on a unit interval. Suppose further that the real numbers
in [0; 1
2) are mapped into ￿1 whereas numbers in [1
2;1] are mapped into ￿2.
For a given ￿, the ￿￿cursed equilibrium then corresponds to the ABEE with
7The prior distribution is assumed to be known to all. Yet, for average strategy conjectures
to emerge in a steady state, players need to know only the distribution of analogy classes,
which they can infer from their observations.
As opposed to the de￿nition in Jehiel and Koessler (2007, p. 5), the coarseness of the
partitions is part of the equilibrium description rather than exogenous. This di⁄erence is not
crucial but rather re￿ecting the conviction that contradicting observations may induce e⁄orts





Figure 1: ABEE coinciding with ￿-cursed equilibrium.
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of the true strategies of types ￿1 and ￿2, respectively. Their joint probability is




2 ) bundles together the two types and induces a con-
jecture that the informed opponent plays the average strategy with probability
￿. Thus the partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to an ABEEAi￿Pi:
Once a player organizes opponent￿ s actions conditioning on a payo⁄-irrelevant
random variable, ￿i(!), it takes a small step to conjecture that opponents use
the average strategy given each class. The observation structure thus leads to
cursed beliefs in a natural way. Notice however, that a player must not know
her analogy class at the interim stage when she chooses her strategy. If she
knew, she would be best-responding either to the correct or to the fully cursed
conjectures rather than to the partially cursed ones.
The analogy-based expectation equilibrium allows us to discuss the complex-
ity of the strategy conjectures. The fully cursed equilibrium coincides with the
ABEE where the analogy partitions are equivalent to information partitions.
However, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium requires that the analogy partition co-
incides with the intersection of the opponents￿information partitions and has
#￿￿i elements. The partially cursed equilibrium turns out to be even more
complex than the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, however. For each type of player
i there must be #￿￿i + 1 analogy classes: ￿rst, one for each of the opponents￿
types to track the behavior of that type pro￿le as in the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium; second, one class which only tracks opponents￿type pro￿les on average
conditional on player￿ s own type. Thus, for those who believe that players tend
to stick to simpler theories rather than to more complex ones, the partially
cursed equilibrium may seem less appealing.
64 Appendix
Proof of proposition 3. Consider the following analogy partition. For each
￿i and each ￿￿i, there is an analogy class ￿￿






p(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿. On
the other hand, given ￿i, for every ￿￿i, the states e ￿
￿1
(￿)n￿￿
i belong to another









Notice that this analogy partition is ￿ner than the private information par-
tition of i: Jehiel and Koessler (2008) show that when the analogy partition
is ￿ner than the private information partition, the analogy based expecta-
tion equilibria are equivalent to the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a virtual game
where the payo⁄ of player i when the state is ! and the action pro￿le is a is
ui(a;!) =
P
!2￿ p(!0j￿i(!))ui(a;!0) where ! 2 ￿. But in fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the
states that are mapped into ￿, there are only states that are mapped into ￿, and
thus ui(a;!) = ui(a;￿) for these states. On the other hand, in fraction ￿ of the
states that are associated witha given type ￿, there are fractions p(￿
0
￿ij￿i) of
states associated with types (￿i;￿
0
￿i) for each ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i. Thus, the virtual
















￿i)). But this is exactly
the ￿￿cursed equilibrium virtual game payo⁄ of type ￿ (Eyster and Rabin,
2005, p. 1631). The Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game are the ￿￿cursed
equilibria of the original game.
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